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Abstract
An important open problem is how values are compared to make simple choices. A natural hypothesis is that the
brain carries out the computations associated with the value comparisons in a manner consistent with the Drift Diffusion
Model (DDM), since this model has been able to account for a large amount of data in other domains. We investigated
the ability of four different versions of the DDM to explain the data in a real binary food choice task under conditions
of high and low time pressure. We found that a seven-parameter version of the DDM can account for the choice and
reaction time data with high-accuracy, in both the high and low time pressure conditions. The changes associated with
the introduction of time pressure could be traced to changes in two key model parameters: the barrier height and the
noise in the slope of the drift process.
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1 Introduction
The drift diffusion model (DDM) is one of the corner-
stones of modern psychology (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff
& McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Smith &
Ratcliff, 2004) and, increasingly, of behavioral neuro-
science (Bogacz, 2007; Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Link,
1992; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). The model has received
increased attention over the last years for several reasons.
First, it has provided more accurate descriptions of accu-
racy and reaction time data than alternative models in a
wide range of psychological tasks, including perceptual
discrimination and go-no-go tasks (Ratcliff & Rouder,
1998, 2000; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Ratcliff, Van Zandt,
& McKoon, 1999). Second, the model is a special case
of many of its competitors, which is a sign of its gener-
ality (Bogacz, 2007; Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes,
& Cohen, 2006; Usher & McClelland, 2001). Finally,
the model has been applied to explain neurophysiological
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data in various perceptual discrimination tasks (Gold &
Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren, Marrett, & Ungerleider, 2008;
Philiastides, Ratcliff, & Sajda, 2006; Ratcliff, Cherian, &
Segraves, 2003; Ratcliff, Hasegawa, Hasegawa, Smith, &
Segraves, 2007; Ratcliff, Philiastides, & Sajda, 2009) and
has a compelling neuronal interpretation.
An important open problem in behavioral neuroscience
is how the brain compares values to make simple choices.
This problem is particularly interesting because there is
ample evidence suggesting that the comparison process
is not deterministic, and that it does not always choose
the best option (Hare, Camerer, Knoepfle, O’Doherty, &
Rangel, 2009; Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009; Hare,
O’Doherty, Camerer, Schultz, & Rangel, 2008; Padoa-
Schioppa & Assad, 2006; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack,
2007). The success of the DDM in the realm of percep-
tual decision making has lead several groups in neuroe-
conomics to speculate that the same computational model
might be used by the brain to make simple value based
choices (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Rangel, 2008; Rangel,
Camerer, & Montague, 2008; Rangel & Hare, 2010; Wal-
lis, 2007). This type of choice refers to situations in
which the brain chooses among several possible stimuli
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associated with different reward values at consumption
(e.g., alternative food items) by assigning a value to ev-
ery item under consideration and comparing the values to
select one of them.
This paper investigates the extent to which the DDM
can explain the accuracy and reaction time data in real
simple food choices. Subjects made real choices between
pairs of appetitive snack foods and had to eat the food that
they chose in a randomly selected trial. This task is con-
ceptually similar to previous experiments on perceptual
discrimination (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998) in which human
subjects had to decide which of two stimuli was bright-
est. The key difference with our experiment is that our
subjects made choices between stimuli associated with
different levels of reward at consumption, which is an
instance of value-based choice. It is interesting to ask
whether both types of tasks are described by the same
computational model because, given the large degree of
specialization in the brain, there is no a priori reason that
the same algorithms would be used in the perceptual and
reward domains.
We compare four different versions of the DDM that
vary in the number of free parameters that they contain,
and in whether the barriers are constant or decrease with
time to speed up decision making (Cisek, Puskas, & El-
Murr, 2009; Ditterich, 2006a). Since the best fitting
model is likely to depend on the speed with which the
decisions have to be made, we carry out separate model
fitting comparisons for the two different time pressure ex-
perimental conditions, which allow us to identify which
aspects of the DDM are responsible for any changes in
performance.
We found that a popular seven-parameter version of the
Ratcliff DDM model (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff
& Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff, et al., 1999) can account for
the data with high-accuracy in both the high and low time
pressure conditions. Furthermore, we also found that the
changes associated with the introduction of time pressure
could be traced to changes in two key model parameters:
the barrier height and the noise in the slope of the drift
process.
Understanding the conditions under which the DDM
can explain the behavioral data in simple value based
choice is important for several reasons. First, it is a neces-
sary first step in exploring the extent to which this model
can account for the underlying neural computations. Sec-
ond, since the DDM has been shown to provide an accu-
rate description of data in other domains, the finding that
the DDM also provides a good computational description
of value-based choices provides insight into the nature of
some basic algorithms that might be at work in many dif-
ferent psychological processes.
To the best of our knowledge, the performance of the
DDM has not been tested before in the realm of value-
based choice, although it has been extensively tested on
other realms. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, it
has provided an accurate quantitative characterization of
the key aspects of the data in every domain to which it
has been applied. For example, the DDM has been tested
in human and non-human primates using the Newsome-
Shadlen random dot motion perceptual discrimination
task (Ditterich, 2006b; Mazurek, Roitman, Ditterich, &
Shadlen, 2003; Philiastides, et al., 2006; Ratcliff, et al.,
2003; Ratcliff, et al., 2007; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008;
Shadlen & Newsome, 2001).
A few studies have explored the ability of models re-
lated to the DDM to explain various common choice pat-
terns. For example, several studies have explored the
ability of Decision Field Theory, which is a variant of the
DDM, to account for patterns of choice in multi-attribute
settings such as choices among lotteries, but have not
provided a full experimental test against the data (Buse-
meyer, Jessup, Johnson, & Townsend, 2006; Busemeyer
& Johnson, 2004). Other studies have investigated the
ability of the Competing Accumulator Model to accom-
plish similar goals (Usher & McClelland, 2001, 2004).
Although these previous studies have shown that rela-
tively simple computational models of decision-making
can account for some stylized facts of the behavioral lit-
erature, their full properties in the realm of simple value
based choice have not been investigated.
1.1 The Drift Diffusion Model and its vari-
ants
We compare the following four versions of the DDM
model.
First, we consider the simple DDM (sDDM), which is
illustrated in Figure 1A. At every instant, the model en-
codes a relative value signal that measures the accumu-
lated “evidence” in favor of the hypothesis that the item
presented on the left has a higher value than the item on
the right (positive values indicate that the left item is bet-
ter; negative values indicate the opposite). The left item
is chosen when the relative value signal crosses the upper
barrier; the right item is chosen when the lower barrier is
crossed. The relative value signal (RVS) evolves accord-
ing to the equation
X(t) = X(t− 1) + µ+ ²(t),
where the drift rate µ denotes the speed at which the bar-
riers are approached, and ²(t) represents white Gaussian
noise centered at zero with constant variance σ. Note that
µ + ²(t) measures the local change in the RVS signal in
favor of the left alternative at the instant t. We assume
that the RVS begins the integration process with a value
of zero.
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Figure 1: A) Schematic representation of the simple Dif-
fusion Decision Model (sDDM) with three parameters.
B) Schematic representation the simple DDM with barri-
ers that decay exponentially towards 0 with time.
A
B
The drift rate is a function of the value differences be-
tween the left and right items, which we denote by d.
In most of the estimation exercises we assume that this
function is linear, but we also show that this assumption
is consistent with our data.
The sDDM is characterized by the following four pa-
rameters: (1) the symmetric location of the barriers (±b),
(2) the linear slope of the drift rate dm (so that in any trial
µ = dm · (vleft − vright), where vleft, vright denotes
the value of the items), (3) the variance of the diffusion
process σ, and (4) a fixed latency time Tm that measures
a fixed amount of time out of every trial that takes place
prior to the initiation of the comparison process (i.e., the
time that passes from the appearance of the items and the
beginning of the DDM computations) and after the con-
clusion of the process (e.g., the time that it takes to ex-
ecute the motor commands necessary to implement the
choice of the DDM). It can be shown that, without loss of
generality, the variance parameter can be fixed, since the
slope and barrier location are identified only up to ratios
of these parameters (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff,
et al., 1999). For this reason in the rest of the analyses
we set σ = 0.1, which is a commonly used normalization
(Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). Thus, the model has only
three parameters that need to be estimated. This normal-
ization is imposed in all of the four models.
Note several properties of the sDDM. First, although
the relative value signal typically moves towards the cor-
rect barrier, the process has noise and thus mistakes are
made. This is illustrated in Figure 1A. Second, the fre-
quency of mistakes increases with the amount of noise
and decreases with the value difference between the two
items. Third, accuracy can be improved by increasing the
amplitude of the barriers, but this comes at the cost of
longer reaction times.
Second, we consider a more complicated version of the
DDM with additional parameters, which we refer to as
the full DDM (fDDM), which has been shown to pro-
vide a more accurate description of reaction time distri-
butions than the sDDM (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Rat-
cliff & Smith, 2004; Ratcliff, et al., 1999). The logic of
the model is similar to the basic DDM except for the in-
troduction of several additional parameters that provide
the necessary flexibility to fit all of the moments of the
response-time data in other experimental domains.
The fDDM is characterized by eight parameters: (1)
It includes the four parameters from the sDDM, (2) a
standard deviation dSD characterizing the noise with
which the drift rate is sampled each period (so that ev-
ery trial with values vleft and vright we have that d ∼
N(dm · (vleft − vright), d2SD), (3) a range Trange pa-
rameter characterizing the support of a uniform distri-
bution from which the initial latency of the process is
sampled every trial (so that every trial T ∼ U(Tm −
Trange
2 , Tm +
Trange
2 )), (4) a parameter zm that models
the mean a bias in the start point of the RVS accumula-
tion process, which allows subjects to be biased towards
or away one of the two barriers, with zm > 0 denoting
biases towards the left barrier, and zm < 0 denoting bi-
ases towards the right barrier, and (5) a range parameter
zrange characterizing the support of a uniform distribu-
tion from which the bias parameter for the start of the
RDV signal is sampled every period (so that every trial,
the start point of the accumulation process is X(T ) = z,
with z ∼ U(zm − zrange2 , zm + zrange2 )).
Third, we consider a version of the sDDM, which we
call the simple collapsing barrier DDM (scbDDM),
which differs from the sDDM only in that the height of
the upper and lower barriers decay exponentially towards
0 with time according to the equation
b(t) = e−rt
where r ≥ 0 is a rate constant. This model collapses to
the sDDM when r = 0. It is characterized by five param-
eters: the same for parameters describing the sDDM and
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 5, No. 6, October 2010 Diffusion model and value-based choice 440
Figure 2: Sample experimental trial.
the barrier rate of decline r. The same normalization re-
garding the variance described above is maintained here.
The motivation for considering time-variant decision
thresholds comes from the fact that several papers have
previously found that they are useful in accounting for
the observation that reaction times tend to be higher in
incorrect than correct trials in many psychological tasks
(Churchland, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2008; Ditterich, 2006b).
As shown in Figure 1B, the collapsing of the barrier can
be thought of as an urgency signal that kicks in to pre-
clude the subject from taking excessively long times to
reach a decision when the two items are of similar value
and thus the drift rate is close to zero. Note, however,
that versions of the fDDM have been previously shown
to generate slower reaction times in error trials without
collapsing barriers (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff, et
al., 1999), which motivates one of the key questions in
the paper: how much additional explanatory power do
they provide at the expense of introducing one additional
parameter?
Fourth, we consider a version of the fDDM, which we
call the full collapsing barrier DDM (fcbDDM), which
differs from the fDDM only in the addition of the param-
eter r measuring the rate at which the barriers collapse
towards zero.
2 Methods
Subjects. Eight Caltech students with normal or corrected
to normal vision participated in two, one-hour experi-
mental sessions. They were compensated $20 per ses-
sion. Subjects were required not to eat for 3 hours before
the experiment in order to increase their subjective value
for the food items.
Experimental Task. On every trial subjects saw high-
resolution color images of 50 different food items includ-
ing an equal mix of salty and sweet foods (e.g., potato
chips and candy bars; see Figure 2 for sample images).
Items are widely available in local stores and were highly
familiar to our subjects. Subjects were seated in a dimly
lit room with their heads positioned in a forehead and
chin rest. Eye-position data were acquired from the right
eye at 1000 Hz using the Eyelink 1000 infrared eyetracker
(SR Research, Osgoode, Canada). The distance between
the computer screen and subject was 80 cm, giving a total
visual angle of 28º × 21º. The images were presented on
a CRT screen (120 Hz) using MATLAB Psychophysics
toolbox and Eyelink toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997;
Cornelissen, Peters, & Palmer, 2002).
Each experimental session (one for each of the two
conditions described below) began with a liking-rating
task. Subjects were shown one food item at a time, cen-
tered on the monitor screen and were asked to rate how
much they would like to eat each food item at the end of
the experiment (−2 to 2 discrete scale). The image was
shown until subjects made a response. We used these rat-
ings as independent measures of each subject’s subjective
value for the items.
In each condition, during the main task, subjects made
750 choices between randomly selected pairs of food
items. Figure 2 depicts the timing of the trial. Each trial
began by requiring subjects to fixate on a central cross
for 800 ms. After the eye-tracker registered a successful
fixation, the cross disappeared leaving the blank screen
for 200 ms. Immediately after, two different food items
were shown simultaneously for 20 ms, centered at 6.2◦
in the left and right hemifields. Next, two faint circular
choice targets were displayed at the same location as the
food items to indicate alternative saccade landing posi-
tions. Subjects made a choice by fixating on the left or
the right target. A 500 ms blank screen separated the tri-
als. At the end of the entire experiment subjects were
required to eat whatever food they chose from one ran-
domly selected trial, thus giving them an incentive to se-
lect the highest value item of the pair on each trial. The
items and locations were randomly selected with the con-
straint that the two images should have different liking-
ratings. d is the absolute value of the difference in liking
rating between the two food items; in any one trial, d can
be at most 4 and is, by design, never 0. The 200 ms gap
between fixation and food display was added because it
has been shown to accelerate saccade initiation (Fischer
& Weber, 1993), which reduces the impact of motor de-
lays on measured reaction times.
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In order to minimize the visual demands of the task,
subjects were encouraged, but not required to fixate ex-
actly on the choice targets. The identity of the choice was
recorded as soon as a saccade was initiated, as measured
by crossing a threshold located 2.2◦ from the center of
the screen on both sides. Reaction times were measured
as the time difference between the onset of the images
and the initiation of the saccade.
Subjects participated in two different task conditions:
high and low time pressure treatments. In the low time
pressure (LTP) condition they were asked to indicate their
choice only after they were sure which item they pre-
ferred. In the high time pressure (HTP) condition they
were asked to make their choices as quickly as possible.
The order was counterbalanced across subjects. We se-
lected these two treatments to compare the ability of the
DDM to account for the data across the range of condi-
tions under which consumers make decisions in the field.
Model fitting procedure. We fit the sDDM and fDDM
versions of the models at the individual subject level us-
ing the DMA-Toolbox (Vandekerckhove & Tuerlinckx,
2008). We assumed that the slope of the drift process
increased linearly with the value difference between the
two items (left minus right), and that the upper (lower)
barrier corresponded to a left (right) choice.
Note that in this literature it is common to let the bias
parameter zm to be different than zero only if there is ev-
idence for either a response or a reaction time bias to one
of the two locations. This was the case in our dataset.
Five subjects exhibited either a significant response bias
towards left or right (binomial t-test vs. 50% null), or
significantly different reaction times for left and right re-
sponses (paired two-sided t-test).
The toolbox had to be modified to allow for the maxi-
mum likelihood estimation of the scbDDM and fcbDDM
versions of the models, since the original code allowed
only for constant barrier heights. Here we provide a brief
description of the changes made to the DMA-Toolbox to
address this problem. The modified toolbox is available
from the authors upon request.
As in the basic case, we assumed that that the slope of
the drift process increased linearly with the value differ-
ence between the two items (left minus right), and that the
upper (lower) barrier corresponded to a left (right) choice.
Since there is no analytical formula to explicitly cal-
culate the model’s predicted distribution of choice accu-
racy and reaction time in the presence of collapsing barri-
ers, we simulated 1000 trials using a Monte Carlo proce-
dure to approximate these distributions for each candidate
set of model parameters to be tested during maximum-
likelihood estimation procedure. The results of the simu-
lation were used to calculate the marginal probability of
making a correct choice, given the location of the cor-
rect stimulus, and to calculate the cumulative distribution
function of the reaction time distribution conditioned on
making a correct or incorrect choice and the location of
the correct stimulus. The likelihood of the model was
computed as the product of the likelihood of the individ-
ual trials. The likelihood for each concrete set of parame-
ters was based on the estimate of the probability of choos-
ing the option chosen in that trial, as well as the proba-
bility of landing on the same reaction time for that trial.
Reaction time bins were given by the 5th, 10th, 30th, 50th,
70th, and 90th percentiles of each subject’s reaction time
distribution.
To carry out each trial simulation, a random-walk ap-
proximation to the drift diffusion process was used (Tuer-
linckx, et al., 2001). At the start of each simulation, a bar-
rier height, drift diffusion rate, and non-decision reaction
time were sampled according to the candidate parame-
ter set, which contains the mean and variance or range of
these quantities. A state variable representing the location
of the drift diffusion process was initialized to the bias
parameter, and then updated using a time step of 10ms
until the state crossed one of the barriers using the rule
described below. The location of the absorbing barrier
(upper or lower) was used to determine which stimulus
was chosen and hence whether this was a correct or in-
correct trial, and the number of update steps needed to
reach a barrier was scaled and added to the non-decision
reaction time and recorded as the net reaction time of the
trial.
In each time step of the simulation, there is a probabil-
ity p that the state variable will increase by a quantity δ,
and a probability (1 − p) will decrease by δ. The quan-
tities p and δ are functions of the drift diffusion rate and
the time step of the simulation. They are defined so that
in the limit, as the time step approaches zero, the random-
walk approximation converges to the true drift diffusion
process. Specifically, δ is defined as σ ·√τ while p is de-
fined as .5 · (1+v ·
√
τ
σ ). Here, σ is the standard deviation
of the noise process and is fixed at .1, τ is the time step
and is set to 10ms, and v is the drift rate for this trial.
The implementation of these changes to the DMA tool-
box required two major changes. First, the module that
calculates the probability of an observed trial given a set
of model parameters was completely rewritten to use the
above procedure. Second, the optimization algorithm to
find maximum likelihood estimates in the “genalg” mod-
ule of the toolbox was changed as well. By default, this
module uses a simplex optimization procedure. However,
Monte Carlo error introduces many erroneous local min-
ima into the objective function and we found that simplex
optimization would often become trapped in a local min-
imum. Thus, in order to increase our ability to find global
minima, we instead used a “multistart” procedure as im-
plemented in the MATLAB Global Optimization toolkit.
Ten candidate parameter sets were chosen approximately
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Table 1: Individual performance by condition, averaged over all values of d.
Mean RT (S.E.M.)
Subject N Accuracy (%) All Trials Correct Trials Error Trials
LOW TIME PRESSURE
1 749 75.8 436 (4.77) 444 (5.73) 411 (7.83)
2 749 81.0 514 (4.03) 510 (4.16) 530 (11.46)
3 750 84.4 623 (5.44) 608 (5.77) 704 (13.37)
4 738 90.0 533 (5.89) 534 (6.02) 521 (22.78)
5 719 97.8 811 (10.26) 807 (10.22) 982 (98.29)
6 750 85.3 681 (6.11) 671 (6.34) 737 (18.60)
7 746 85.7 480 (6.23) 484 (6.37) 452 (17.53)
8 738 66.8 520 (6.73) 510 (6.67) 540 (13.10)
MEAN 742 83.2 574 578 552
HIGH TIME PRESSURE
1 749 76.5 343 (2.88) 344 (3.24) 339 (6.26)
2 744 73.1 497 (3.13) 496 (3.64) 498 (6.14)
3 747 75.2 479 (4.13) 475 (4.40) 492 (9.94)
4 747 85.3 404 (3.64) 398 (3.76) 439 (11.26)
5 745 80.1 406 (2.44) 405 (2.57) 409 (6.57)
6 738 71.2 520 (3.70) 521 (4.45) 518 (6.60)
7 747 63.5 325 (2.61) 335 (3.35) 307 (3.92)
8 748 80.7 436 (3.26) 434 (3.49) 446 (8.49)
MEAN 745 75.7 426 426 426
uniformly in the space of plausible parameter sets, and
a separate simulated annealing procedure was run using
each parameter set as a starting point of the annealing
process. The best solution from this procedure was then
run through a simplex algorithm to procedure the final es-
timate of the optimal parameter set for each subject. The
results of this procedure were robust to changes in the
random seed used for annealing and choosing the starting
candidate parameter sets, suggesting the parameter sets
we found were close to the true global optimum.
Model selection. We computed the Bayes Informa-
tion Criterion (BIC) of each model, which is given as
−2 · log − likelihood(data|model) + k, where k is the
number of free parameters in the model, and N is the
number of trials used to fit the model. The relative fit
of each pair of candidate models was tested as follows.
First, we computed the difference in BIC scores for each
individual subject and model. Second, we computed pop-
ulations statistics by carrying out a two-sided paired t-test
over the individual BIC score differences. If this differ-
ence was significant at the .05 level, then the model with
the lower BIC was said to be a better fit of the data. This
method allowed us to rank the models from best to worse
fitting. The ordering of models did not change when the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was used instead of
the BIC.
3 Results
Behavioral results. Table 1 and Figure 3 depict the main
behavioral results of the experiment. Subjects chose
the best item (as determined by their own liking-ratings)
more frequently in the low time pressure than in the high
time pressure condition (83.2%, SEM=3.27 vs. 75.7%,
SEM=2.37; two-sided paired t-test, t=1.9, p=.09), even
after controlling for the value distance d between the two
items (as measured by the liking-rating of the best minus
the worse items). Furthermore, choice accuracy (defined
as the probability of choosing the item with the highest
liking rating) increased with the value distance in both
conditions (t=−7.21, p=.0004 for a two-sided paired t-
test of accuracy at d=1f versus d=4 in the speed condi-
tion; t=−6.84, p=.0005 for the same test in the accuracy
condition).
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Table 2: Average BIC values for each model and condition. SEMs across subjects are listed in parenthesis.
LOW TIME PRESSURE HIGH TIME PRESSURE ALL TRIALS
sDDM 2765 (52.66) 2552 (196.32) 2659 (92.53)
fDDM 2676 (50.20) 2491 (199.70) 2584 (101.71)
scbDDM 2684 (30.44) 2532 (200.29) 2596 (104.68)
fcbDDM 2679 (51.21) 2496 (197.85) 2588 (101.46)
Figure 3: A) Choice accuracies in the low time pressure
(red dashed) and high-time pressure (blue solid) condi-
tions (N=8). B) Reaction times in both conditions. Bars
denote SEMs. Horizontal tics are offset for clarity.
A
B
Consistent with the experimental manipulation, sub-
jects made choices faster in the high time pressure con-
dition than in the low time pressure condition (426 ms,
SEM=24.91 vs. 574 ms, SEM=43.53; two-sided paired t-
test, t=3.68, p=.007), even after controlling for value dis-
tance. Reaction times decreased with d, in the low time
pressure condition (from the mean of 616 ms for d=1 to
517 ms for d=4; t=4.12, p=.006) but only slightly so in the
high time pressure condition (from the mean of 433ms for
d=1 to 401ms for d=4; t=3.56, p=.01).
Model fitting in the low time pressure condition. We
carried out all possible pair-wise comparisons of the BIC
measures of quality of fit among the four models using
only the data from the low-time pressure condition. (See
methods for details.) We found that the fDDM has a
significantly lower BIC score than the sDDM (t=−3.25,
p<.014) and the scbDDM (t=−2.25, p<.05). While its
BIC score is lower than the fcbDDM, the difference did
not reach significance (t=−1.07, p<.32). We also found
that adding a collapsing barrier to the sDDM improved its
fitting (t=−.83,p<.43), but that adding it to the fDDM did
not (t=1.07, p<.32), although in neither case did the dif-
ference reach significance. Table 2 summarizes the BIC
scores for every model and condition. Table 3 provides
a full description of the estimated parameters for every
subject in the fDDM in each condition.
Model fitting in the high time pressure condition. We
also carried out all possible pair-wise comparisons of the
BIC measures of quality of fit among the four models us-
ing only the data from the high-time pressure condition.
The reason for carrying out this model comparison sep-
arately was to rule out the a priori intuitive possibility
that collapsing barriers might play a role under high time
pressure, but not under low time pressure. We found very
similar results: the fDDM has a lower BIC score than the
sDDM (t=−3.71, p<.008), the scbDDM (t= -.25, p<.81),
and the fcbDDM (t=−1.89, p<.10). Adding a collapsing
barrier to the sDDM improved its fitting (t=3.32, p<.01),
but adding it to the fDDM did not (t=1.89, p<.1).
Model fitting in the joint dataset. Finally, we carried
out all possible pair-wise comparisons in the full dataset
to investigate which model accounted best for the full-
dataset. We found very similar results: the fDDM has a
lower BIC score than the sDDM (t=−5.12, p<.0015), the
scbDDM (t=−1.74, p<.13), and the fcbDDM (t=−2.17,
p<.067). Adding a collapsing barrier to the sDDM im-
proved its fitting (t=3.00, p<.02), but adding it to the
fDDM did not (t=−2.17, p<.067).
Fits of the fDDM model. The previous results show that
the fDDM provides the best relative fit of the data, but is
it good in absolute terms? To investigate this question
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Table 3: Estimated parameters for every subject in the fDDM by time pressure condition. The p-values listed at the
bottom are for a comparison of the distribution of individual parameters across the two time pressure conditions.
Subject b (units) dm (unit/s) dSD (units/s) Tm (ms) Trange (ms) Zm (units) zrange (units)
HIGH TIME PRESSURE
1 0.065 0.094 0.091 245 65 −0.0005 0.001
2 0.063 0.094 0.142 397 142 −0.0005 0.001
3 0.053 0.174 0.415 434 335 −0.0005 0.026
4 0.075 0.157 0.247 301 186 −0.0005 0.011
5 0.062 0.165 0.217 336 141 0 0.028
6 0.054 0.107 0.180 456 228 0 0.045
7 0.064 0.162 0.325 351 164 0.0003 0.016
8 0.044 0.065 0.129 280 151 0 0.021
mean 0.060 0.127 0.218 350 176 −0.0002 0.019
LOW TIME PRESSURE
1 0.080 0.079 0.286 316 23 0 0.02
2 0.085 0.15 0.139 322 149 −0.0005 0.03
3 0.12 0.164 0.239 436 245 0.055 0.016
4 0.088 0.134 0.036 392 375 −0.003 0.012
5 0.255 0.164 0.084 420 334 −0.0005 0.186
6 0.093 0.123 0.058 521 312 −0.0065 0.015
7 0.090 0.083 0.177 359 186 0 0.078
8 0.115 0.089 0.012 270 15 −0.0005 0.083
mean 0.102 0.123 0.129 379 204 0.0055 0.055
p-values for two-sided paired t-test comparison across conditions
0.033 0.78 0.09 0.19 0.53 0.45 0.12
we carried out 1000 simulations of each observation in
the dataset, by running the fDDM with the estimated pa-
rameters for each condition given the relative value d for
those trials. Figure 4 displays the results for the low time
pressure trials. Figure 5 displays them for the high time
pressure trials. In Figure 4A-C and 5A-C, paired t-tests at
every level of difficulty d fail to reject the null hypothesis
that these data were sampled from the theoretical fDDM
reaction time distribution for that level of difficulty.
Testing the linearity of the drift rate. All of the esti-
mation and simulation exercises described above assume
that the drift rate is linear in the value difference variable
d. We tested the validity of this assumption by estimating
a version of the sDDM in which the parameters were al-
lowed to change by difficulty (given by value best minus
value worse). The results, depicted in Figure 6, show that
the linear assumption is consistent with the data in the
low time pressure (r2 = .99, p<.00005) and high time
pressure (r2 = .95, p<.0005) conditions.
The effect of time pressure. We compared the estimated
parameters of the fDDM that were fitted subject by sub-
ject in each of the two conditions separately. This allowed
us to assess which parameters of the DDM are essential to
explain the differences between the two conditions. The
results are described in Table 3. The only two parame-
ters that changes significantly or marginally significantly
from the low to the high time pressure conditions are a
decrease in the barrier height and an increase in the noise
of the drift slope. These changes are highly intuitive. A
decrease in the barrier height speeds up choices by mak-
ing it easier to reach the barrier. A decrease in processing
time might decrease the accuracy with which the under-
lying value of the items can be measured, which implies
that the integration slope should be noisier. Note that the
results are likely to be marginally significant due to the
low number of subjects.
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Figure 4: Fits of the estimated fDDM in the low time pressure condition. A) Probability that the best item is chosen
as a function of difficulty (equal to value best — value worse) in correct trials. B) Mean reaction time as a function
of difficulty in correct trials. C) Mean reaction time as a function of difficulty in incorrect trials. D) Reaction time
distribution in correct trials. E) Reaction time distribution in incorrect trials. Bars denote SEMs. The horizontal tics
are offset for clarity.
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4 Discussion
Several behavioral neuroscience groups have speculated
that the brain might use a version of the DDM to make
simple value based choices. A first step in testing this
hypothesis is to investigate the extent to which the model
can explain basic data. Our results show that a popular
seven-parameter version of the DDM (Ratcliff & McK-
oon, 2008; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff & Smith,
2004; Ratcliff, et al., 1999) can account for the data with
high-accuracy in both the high and low time pressure con-
ditions. Furthermore, we also found that the changes as-
sociated with the introduction of time pressure could be
traced to changes in two key model parameters: the bar-
rier height and the noise in the slope of the drift process.
We explored the extent to which the fits of the DDM
improved with the introduction of collapsing barriers,
which some groups have argued are important to account
for the full distribution of reaction times in correct and in-
correct trials (Churchland, et al., 2008; Ditterich, 2006b).
We found that the introduction of this feature was use-
ful when the baseline model was a simple DDM, but not
when it was the popular full version of the DDM.
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Figure 5: Fits of the estimated fDDM in the high time pressure condition. A) Probability that the best item is chosen
as a function of difficulty (equal to value best — value worse). B) Mean reaction time as a function of difficulty in
correct trials. C) Mean reaction time as a function of difficulty in incorrect trials. D) Reaction time distribution in
correct trials. E) Reaction time distribution in incorrect trials. Bars denote SEMs. The horizontal tics are offset for
clarity.
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Previous studies have also explored the effect of time
on the ability of the DDM to explain the data in per-
ceptual discrimination tasks (Ratcliff, 2002; Ratcliff &
Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2003; Tha-
par, Ratcliff, & McKoon, 2003). Their findings parallel
ours: a change in parameters of the DDM, specially an
increase in the size of the barriers as time pressure in-
creases, is able to provide a highly accurate description
of the response and reaction time data.
One of the most successful applications of the DDM is
to perceptual decision making tasks (Churchland, Kiani,
& Shadlen, 2008; Ditterich, 2006b; Ditterich, Mazurek,
& Shadlen, 2003; Gold & Shadlen, 2001, 2002; Gold &
Shadlen, 2007; Hanks, Ditterich, & Shadlen, 2006; Huk
& Shadlen, 2005; Mazurek, et al., 2003; Palmer, Huk, &
Shadlen, 2005; Philiastides et al., 2006; Ratcliff et al.,
2003; Ratcliff et al., 2007; Ratcliff et al., 2003; Roit-
man & Shadlen, 2002; Shadlen & Newsome, 1996, 2001;
Smith, Lee, Wolfgang, & Ratcliff, 2009). There is an
important difference between the applications to percep-
tual and value based decision-making. In the standard
Newsome-Shadlen random dot motion task, subjects are
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Figure 6: Estimated fitted drift rates in the sDDM by
value distance. A) Low time pressure condition. B) High
time pressure condition. Bars denote SEMs.
A
B
exposed to a stochastic stimulus that is assumed to gener-
ate perceptual noise signals in area MT. Under appropri-
ate assumptions, it can be shown that the drift-diffusion
model implements an optimal decision-making process
that amounts to a sequential-likelihood ratio test (Bogacz,
2007; Bogacz et al., 2006; Gold & Shadlen, 2001, 2002;
Gold & Shadlen, 2007). In our model the stimuli are non-
stochastic, in the sense that the image is non-changing.
However, we hypothesize that in order to construct value
the brain needs to integrate a series of noisy signals about
the value of the stimuli, in this case generated internally.
In particular, we hypothesize that the brain assigns value
to the stimuli by sequentially and stochastically extract-
ing features of the stimuli, retrieving the learnt values
for such features, and then integrating those values. Al-
though the objective nature of the noise is quite differ-
ent in both cases, the computational problem has similar
properties.
An important question for future research is how does
the brain implement each of the features of the full DDM
during value based choices, which we have shown pro-
vides a good quantitative description of the data.
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